This interview was conducted by journalists from Utro Fevralya. With the editorial team’s permission, we are publishing it in full on our website.
Have the goals, objectives, or agenda of the “Vesna” movement changed with the start of the war in Ukraine?
Our goal remains the same: a free and democratic Russia that upholds human rights. The start of the full-scale invasion only reaffirmed our belief that this is what we must fight for. If our country were already a full-fledged democracy with developed institutions (a free press, an independent judiciary, fair elections, and so on), this war would never have happened.
Imagine that power in Russia belonged to a parliament elected through free and fair elections in a politically pluralistic environment. It’s unlikely that such a parliament would contain many supporters of war: the deputies’ mandates would truly depend on the will of the voters, and people do not like to bear the costs of military adventures. With a free press, those costs would be more than obvious.
Even if the parliament somehow decided to go to war, such a decision could be challenged in an independent court: even the current Russian legislation provides no grounds for waging an aggressive offensive operation. The problem here lies in dictatorship, the absence of checks and balances, and the total suppression of civil society.
Broadly speaking, all armed conflicts in Europe since 1945 have been instigated by authoritarian regimes. Countries with developed democratic institutions do not wage war on each other: they have built systems based on cooperation, and their conflicts are resolved through diplomacy.
Should “Vesna” and other anti-war organizations unite into a “super-organization” to achieve the main goal (ending the war)? Or should there be many different protest initiatives?
Anti-war movements don’t need to unite into a single organization. There are many reasons for this.
The agenda of a “unified” organization would be much more watered down and would reach a smaller audience. At the same time, multiple organizations can reach entirely different groups of people: we focus on liberal youth, the “Feminist Anti-War Resistance” targets women, the “Anti-War Sick Leave” group speaks to workers, and “Students Against War” engages students and teachers. Some initiatives attract people with left-wing views, others with moderate or liberal views, and still others with right-wing or conservative perspectives. This diversity is a strength of the movement.
Additionally, we may have different approaches, proposals, and visions regarding the causes of the war and how to end it. Instead of struggling to get leadership in a “unified organization” to accept one idea, we can now present it to various initiatives, gain support from some, and implement it. We don’t know which idea will “take off” and which won’t. We must experiment with various non-violent methods, and having multiple organizations, rather than one, is much better suited for these experiments.
There’s nothing wrong with competing for supporters’ attention. This is an integral part of democratic politics, and depoliticization is a significant issue in our country. However, the current configuration of the anti-war movement makes this competition less confrontational. We don’t quarrel among ourselves—we do what we believe is right and sometimes find support from allies, sometimes not.
Tell us about your projects—“Visible Protest” and “Impeachment 2.0.”
“Visible Protest” emerged spontaneously. People began sending photos of various anti-war materials to our bot, and we started publishing them. It was a powerful grassroots impulse. A huge number of people engaged in anti-war agitation without any calls to action or tools: they began making leaflets and stickers, coming up with slogans and forms of protest on their own. The green ribbon is also a completely grassroots story. We simply created a platform to make this grassroots activity visible in the media space and gathered all forms of protest into a single guide.
The project serves an essential function: it helps people realize they are not alone and inspires them. For years, the regime convinced everyone that opposition activists were marginal, isolated, and crazy—that everyone else thought differently. “Visible Protest” proves this isn’t true: people are speaking out against the war in Moscow, in small villages on the border with China you’ve never heard of, among young people, and among pensioners. These people may not be able to show their faces, but they are everywhere.
Our impeachment campaign has been ongoing for a long time. Its goal is not to achieve Putin’s resignation in the short term. We understand this is an unlikely scenario. However, it is entirely possible to sow doubt among deputies and increase chaos within the government.
Deputies are people too, believe it or not. They, too, buy into propaganda and believe the entire country unanimously supports the war. This reinforces their belief that they are on the winning side, backed by millions of people. Now imagine each deputy starts receiving mountains of complaints from dissatisfied citizens daily. They will inevitably begin to question whether they are on the right side and what the cost of supporting the war might be.
The impeachment campaign is thus a method of psychological pressure. The results depend on how widespread the practice of sending such complaints becomes and on the whims of chance. Perhaps some deputies will eventually break and side with the anti-war movement.
What forms of protest are currently possible in Russia?
Virtually all forms of protest are now criminalized. Holding a “sanctioned” rally is impossible, and “unsanctioned” ones are brutally suppressed. Solo pickets, which technically do not require “sanctioning” under current laws, are effectively banned. Public statements are prosecuted with no regard for the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech.
Moreover, the costs of participating in public actions have risen sharply since the start of the war. The authorities enacted a new repressive “fake news” law, and it has had its effect: people became more afraid, and protest activity plummeted. However, the authorities have still failed to completely suppress anti-war resistance.
In practice, only two relatively safe forms of activity remain: guerrilla actions, such as distributing anti-war leaflets, stickers, and newspapers, and quasi-legal actions, such as sending appeals to the State Duma, which are not yet prosecuted.
Is there an idea that could change Russia right now? Which social stratum will drive change? Who supports Putin, and who is your audience?
This is a search for a silver bullet. There is no such bullet.
However, it’s worth discussing social strata. First, the anti-war movement includes people of diverse views: we see participation from citizens with varying incomes, residents of both large cities and small towns. They defy all the stereotypes about the opposition that propaganda has been trying to impose on us for years.
Second, a crucial task of the anti-war movement is to weaken the pillars supporting Putin’s regime. These include the loyalty of security forces, bureaucrats, state employees, and workers at state-owned companies. Their loyalty often stems from fear, but more frequently from a misunderstanding of how their actual interests conflict with those of the ruling clique.
Putin relies on people who, in reality, suffer from his policies: those same state employees could receive truly decent salaries if the funds weren’t being spent on military adventures. We need to reach these people and explain why they should support the anti-war and democratic movements and how they can do so with minimal risks.
That’s why we reach out to different audiences. Of course, we first unite like-minded people—those who oppose the war and are ready to fight for a free Russia. But we also continue to engage with those who support the regime.
Are discussions about collective (societal) guilt necessary right now?
That depends on who is leading them and what is being said.
It’s absurd when someone like former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul tweets about whether Russians feel ashamed. Putin’s regime has spent decades destroying democratic institutions, killing political opponents, punishing any attempts at self-organization, and doing everything possible to atomize and pacify society. All of this happened with the silent consent of many politicians in the U.S. and EU.
The West never questioned Putin’s legitimacy, continued to buy Russian oil and gas, and even provided technologies used for surveillance on activists and suppression of peaceful protests. Meanwhile, civil society kept fighting—against enormous odds and without any help from abroad. And we’re the ones who should feel ashamed?
It’s a different matter when Ukrainians affected by the war assign collective guilt to Russians. These feelings are understandable, and Ukrainians have every right to them. While these feelings don’t reflect the actual state of affairs, they do represent the pain and suffering of the Ukrainian people. In that sense, they’re a normal reaction to absolutely abnormal circumstances.
It’s an entirely different story when Russians themselves engage in this discussion. We need this dialogue to understand how we are experiencing this war, what we feel about it, and what we should do about it. Guilt is a natural reaction, but it’s not the most productive one. It’s important to realize that self-flagellation is meaningless; action is far more crucial. And that action should stem not from a sense of atonement but from an understanding that Putin has committed a terrible crime, including against Russia.
If we understand who is truly to blame and why, we can find a realistic answer to the question of what to do. If all Russians are guilty, then what’s the solution? Russia isn’t going anywhere. Russians are no better or worse than other nations—they aren’t inherently more “wild” or “stupid.” Our country has simply fallen into a trap that many have encountered throughout history—a loss of appreciation for the value of democracy.
Thus, the idea of collective guilt is a way to dilute responsibility. If everyone is guilty, then no one bears any responsibility, and there’s nothing to do but repent. But if we understand that the blame lies with dictatorship in its broadest sense, then we have a way out of this nightmare, with democracy at the end of the path.
“Leave or stay?”—Is this still a critical question for Russian opposition members?
Yes. However, there’s no universal answer to it. Leaving or staying is a personal choice, and many variables are at play. If someone faces criminal prosecution, it’s probably better to leave—you can’t do much from a detention center. If someone is relatively safe, they might choose to stay.
In any case, it’s possible to contribute to the anti-war movement and take active steps both inside the country and abroad. Every situation and every decision is unique. Judging someone for their choice, in our view, is wrong.
Why is opposition needed right now? What are your key objectives?
Opposition is essential in any state because, without it, there can be no discourse—and therefore no progress. Moreover, every society is heterogeneous, and different people need different representatives. Democracy cannot exist without political pluralism.
That’s precisely why the regime believes we must be destroyed. We fight for democracy, peace, and human rights—values that are the opposite of the regime’s policies and repugnant to it. This is our goal. And there are many tasks ahead. The most important right now are to influence public opinion, create an anti-war majority, and overcome society’s depoliticization.
